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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN SPORT: CHALLENGES AND BENEFITS 
Daniel Pannett* 
 
Abstract:  This article analyses the relationship between sport law and employment law – in 
particular,  the  legal  recognition  and  involvement  of  collective  bargaining  in  professional 
sport. Drawing on a number of specific examples – professional rugby, Formula One motor 
racing and mixed martial arts – this article attempts to identify existing and possible future 
challenges for the applicability of collective bargaining in this unusual legal context. Section 
B sets out the general advantages of collective bargaining in a sporting context, then explores 
the applicable legal structures and characteristics present in professional sport in more detail. 
Section C examines these characteristics in the specific context of professional rugby, motor 
racing and mixed martial arts. Finally, Section D examines both systemic and specific legal 
issues that may arise if and when collective influence grows in the professional sporting 
employment relations.  The conclusion of this  article, Section E, is  that, whilst  collective 
bargaining presents a number of challenges to the law of professional sport, these challenges 
can (and should) be overcome. 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Collective bargaining is not readily associated with the world of professional sport, at least in 
the United Kingdom.1 However, a significant body of academic writing, primarily in the 
United States, 2 and growing comment on the need to protect the welfare and rights of 
professional athlete-employees3 suggests that collective bargaining in professional sport may 
be a desirable phenomenon. This paper analyses the interaction between sport   law and 
collective bargaining, drawing on a number of specific examples to demonstrate that the 
peculiar nature of sport law creates a number of different challenges for the applicability of 
collective bargaining. However, it will also be argued that many of these challenges are not 
insurmountable and that collective bargaining may increase in prevalence as a result. 
Section B outlines the general advantages of collective bargaining in employment 
law, then discusses the legal framework governing professional sport and the employment 
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relationships therein. Section C analyses the legal structures underpinning the employment 
relationships of three sports – rugby union football, Formula One motorsport (F1), and mixed 
martial arts (MMA) – and the varying levels of collective influence they possess. Finally, 
Section  D  uses  these  examples  and  the  background  of  Section  B  to  assess  several  legal 
challenges  facing  collective  bargaining  in  professional  sport:  the  proper  parties  to  any 
collective bargaining agreement, superstar players, the effect of competition law, and possible 
conflict of laws issues. 
 
B.  BACKGROUND AND THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF PROFESSIONAL 
SPORT 
1.  The desirability of collective bargaining in the employment relationship4 
The arguments for the involvement of trade unions in the formation and maintenance of the 
employment relationship in sport are as strong as any other industry. As noted by Greenfield, 
‘the  theoretical  law  of  contract  often  fits  uneasily  into  the  relationship  of  employer  and 
employee’ given the inherently unequal bargaining power between the parties.5 Trade unions 
are able to provide a collective voice which matches the bargaining power of the employer in 
the employment relationship and imparts a degree of balance.6 Without such a collective 
voice,  an  employee  is  arguably  vulnerable  to  the  imposition  of  harsh  terms  in  their 
employment contract. In the context of sport, Insley summarises the advantages well: 
Collective bargaining provides greater equality in bargaining power and contracts, 
and is fairer to the players and officials than traditional contracts. … By forcing both 
labor  and  management  to  come  to  the  table  and  bargain  together,  collective 
bargaining provides for an agreement which best represents both sides. In contrast, 
individual contracts created under traditional contract law result in complete control 
by the all-powerful management.7 
The  employee,  given  collective  voice,  is  better  able  to  take  advantage  of  the  legal 
mechanisms designed at safeguarding employee rights as they are applied more forcefully en 
masse. Thus, matters such as contract length, compensation, grievance procedures, and player 
safety become bargaining chips rather than unilaterally imposed conditions.8 
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2.  The special nature of sport 
There are, however, a number of specific characteristics relating to professional sport that 
inexorably  colour  these  general  advantages.  These  factors  must  be  considered  when 
considering how (or if) to implement and control collective bargaining. 
a)  History 
Collective bargaining in sport has a long history in the United States, where the three most 
popular domestic sports  – American football, basketball,  and baseball  – are now heavily 
unionised. Baseball was the first sport to be professionalised in the late eighteenth century.9 
Initial American collective bargaining agreements were threadbare in their coverage 10 but 
have  since  evolved  to  union -dominated  industries  with  fiercely  negotiated  collective 
agreements.11 These agreements now cover matters such as player transfers and freedom of 
movement.12 Collective bargaining in United States professional sport has led to a large 
number of work stoppages. 13 Stoppages have been implemented both through employee 
strikes and employer lockouts; Feldman notes that in the United States, ‘the last seven work 
stoppages in professional sports have been the result of lockouts’.14 
The scope and complexity of collective bargaining in the major United States sports 
means that they are not analysed in substantive detail in this paper. United States sports are 
relative outliers in that the same level of collective culture has not developed in other areas. 
Thus, the focus of this paper is on sports without developed collective bargaining cultures. 
Professional rugby in New Zealand has been chosen as a ‘collectivised’ example due to its 
relatively recent development and self-contained structure. 
b)  Particular features of the sport industry 
As with any industry, there are a number of legal features particular to professional sport 
which affect the dynamics of the employment relationship. The first is the nature of sport 
itself.  Unlike  many  industries  which  operate  as  a  ‘pure’  economic  activity,  sport  has 
‘historically been more of a social, cultural and educational activity rather than an economic 
pursuit  …  a  leisure-time  activity  rather  than  as  an  entertainment  “product”’.15 Although 
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professionalism  has  eroded  this  truth  to  a  degree, 16 it  is  undeniable  that  regulation  of 
professional sport, particularly in respect of employment, must take account of ‘the good of 
the game’.17 Professional sport also brings intangible benefits such as a ‘positive impact on 
the psyche of the viewer [and a] sense of community’.18 Thus, the Council of Europe has 
noted that regulatory oversight of sport must focus (inter alia) on ‘the promotion of sport for 
all as a means of improving quality of life’.19 
Secondly, competitors  within the sport industry  must  collude and co-operate with 
each other on some level  to  ensure that ‘unpredictability [and thus  integrity] of sporting 
events may be guaranteed’.20 As Feldman notes, ‘each of the teams must reach agreements 
with each other on a variety of matters, including the rules of the game, schedules, procedures 
for signing and trading players, and other terms and conditions of employment’.21 
Third,  the  governing  body  of  a  given  sport  –  the  organisation  charged  with  the 
regulation and operation of a sport’s professional competition – is unusual in that it is able to 
unilaterally impose alterations to athletes’ orthodox employment relationship.22 Regulatory 
measures23 can be imposed with impunity and without any true consent (or even awareness24) 
from employees, given that acceptance  of such terms is the only realistic way in which 
participation in the sport is possible.25 This is reflective of a governing body’s monopolistic 
position in a given sport which gives it effectively complete control as ‘buyer’ or employer of 
the skills of players wishing to take part in their respective competitions.26 
Finally, trade unions themselves are uniquely defined in respect of professional sport. 
The  most  obvious  point  is  that  athletes’  typically  short  careers  result  in  a  constantly 
fluctuating  and  uncertain  union  membership. 27 Further, employees in a sport union are 
uniquely positioned in that ‘athletes are not fungible to employers and … do not possess 
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homogeneous skills’.28 As their skills are essentially non-transferable to any other industry, 
sport  unions  are  at  a  comparative  disadvantage.  However,  that  disadvantage  is  arguably 
shared by the employer as well, as it will likely want the best athletes – the ones with those 
unique, non-transferable skills – to compete in its league. This places a particular gloss on the 
bargaining process.29 
c)  Particular features of the sport employment relationship 
The unique aspects of the professional sport industry inexorably alter the traditional notions 
of the employment relationship. The most notable aspect of this is the ‘web’ of contracting 
parties involved and the multiplicity of relationships that can result from that ‘web’. This is 
important due to the central role the law of contract (including employment contracts) plays 
in athletes’ participation in a sport.30 Berry and Gould note that there are at least five interests 
within a professional  sport, all with  particular  and different  interests:  leagues  (governing 
bodies), clubs, players, agents, and players’ attorneys.31 Thus, a player will likely be subject 
to the rules of a governing body, his club, and the leagues in which he competes.32 Beloff has 
further suggested that players enter into contracts with each other when they take the field.33 
This can affect a player’s ‘traditional’ employment contract or result in a number of 
different, interrelated employment relationships.34 The relationship between an athlete and 
the governing body has even resulted in litigation in several cases, a point discussed in more 
detail in Section D below.35 An athlete’s acceptance of control by any or all of these bodies, 
along  with  reciprocity  in  obligation  between  the  parties,  may  give  rise  to  contractual 
relationships  or  a  need  to  expressly  recognise  and  regulate  the  contractual  relationship 
between them.36 These legal issues beg the question of the appropriate bargaining parties in 
any collective bargaining relationship, a point discussed in more detail in Section D below.37 
3.  The slow development of collective employment culture in F1 and MMA 
There are also a number of external reasons for a lack of collective influence in some specific 
sports such as MMA and F1, two of the sports discussed in more detail in Section C. These 
reasons are tied both to the history of these sports, and to definitional issues resulting in 
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laissez-faire governmental attitudes. It should be borne in mind, however, that some of the 
aspects of the sporting industry discussed above – in particular, the narrowness of the market 
and monopolistic governing bodies – may also restrict union growth in all sport. 
One possible explanation for a lack of developed collective bargaining in F1 (whose 
popularity and organisation has historically rested mainly in Europe38) and indeed, European 
sport  generally, is the comparatively non -interventionist tradition that has developed i n 
contrast to the heavily unionised United States. Unlike the United States, there is no well -
developed legal recognition of sports unions in the European Union.39 
However, that is not to say that European Community law ignored the regulation of 
sport entirely. Several instruments, such as the European Model of Sports in 1998, the 
Council of Europe’s 2002 Nice Declaration, and the 2007 White Paper on Sport,40 do set out 
‘the specialties of European sports, its social role, and the impact of those structures on the 
legal regulation of the sports world’.41 However, such measures have been rightly described 
as ‘soft law’, which has no binding legal effect.42 Moreover, no relevant legislation of any 
significance exists in the United Kingdom.43 In Europe, the sport employment relationship 
(indeed, much of its regulation overall) was left to the parties controlling it.44 
This lack of European state regulation led to development of the sport industry’s own 
private norms known as lex sportiva, which brought with it a much more deferential attitude 
from courts that allowed for sporting leagues and governing bodies to essentially define their 
own  (employment)  relationships,  which  unsurprisingly  would  not  include  unionisation.45 
Thus, ‘enormous deference’46 is shown to bodies that are presumed to have both the expert 
knowledge of the sport industry, and its best interests at heart. As noted by Gardiner, this is a 
dangerous presumption, with there being a real risk that such bodies ‘cannot be trusted to 
uphold these Corinthian values [of fair play and the good of the game]’, particularly given the 
growing internationalisation of professional sport.47 
Secondly,  there  arguably  has  not  been  enough  time  for  relatively  newly 
professionalised sports such as MMA to develop a strong collective culture, unlike American 
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sports such as baseball, which began to unionise in the late nineteenth century.48 This ‘late 
bloomers’  argument  is  supported  by  Greenfield,  who  notes  that  rugby  in  the  United 
Kingdom, which only became professional in 1995, has struggled to form effective unions.49 
However, it should be noted that effective and powerful rugby unions have evolved since 
then in South Africa50 and New Zealand51 with only a few more years of professionalism than 
MMA. 
Third, it is arguable that the ext reme physical danger presented by sports such as 
MMA and F1 render collective bargaining more difficult. It is clear that such sports present a 
very real risk of catastrophic employee injury. Thus, an employer is obviously less likely to 
be amenable to a collective voice demanding concessions on matters such as athlete safety 
standards and compensation or pensions for injured employees. The danger of catastrophic 
injury means that a collective contract (and the bargaining process) must take account of this, 
in terms of matters such as compensation, insurance and contract length. 52 However, as with 
the ‘late bloomers’ point, it must be noted that this argument is not universally applicable. 
For example, the very dangerous full contact sport of American Football is heavily unionised 
in  the  United  States,  as  is  rugby  in  countries  such  as  South  Africa  and  New  Zealand, 
suggesting this is not an insurmountable problem. 
Finally, the ad hoc and fragmented nature of union formation in F1 has led to repeated 
failures  in  attempts  to  collectively  bargain.  Although  there  are  now  reasonably  well-
developed contractual relationships between the relevant parties,53 this was not always the 
case. Until the late 1990s, for example, teams ‘cared little for the detailed work of tying up 
commercial  agreements  [concerning]  trackside  advertising,  gate  money,  hospitality, 
television rights and so on’.54 Moreover, despite several attempts to unionise since the 1970s, 
a teams’ union has broken and reformed on multiple occasions, with dissolution as recent as 
2013.55 Finally, the formation of a drivers’ union, whilst successful in 1961, also dissolved in 
the 1980s and arguably still suffers from a lack of concrete bargaining power. 
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C.  COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PRACTICE: RUGBY, FORMULA ONE, 
AND MIXED MARTIAL ARTS 
This section analyses examples of collective influence in three sports: professional rugby in 
New Zealand; Formula One motor racing (F1); and MMA. These sports can be viewed on a 
spectrum, with rugby at the ‘collectivised’ end, MMA at the ‘individualised’ end, and F1 
somewhere  in  the  middle.  This  section  will  provide  some  background  to  each  sport  and 
explain the applicable legal structures for each. These specific examples will then be used in 
Section D in assessing specific legal challenges faced by collective bargaining in sport. 
1.  Professional rugby in New Zealand 
The New Zealand Rugby Union (NZRU) is the governing body of professional rugby in New 
Zealand. It is an incorporated society formed under the Incorporated Societies Act 1908.56 
The NZRU is a member of the International Rugby Board (IRB), the international governing 
body of professional rugby; and South Africa New Zealand Australia Rugby Ltd (SANZAR), 
which organises the Super Rugby57 and the Rugby Championship58 tournaments. The NZRU 
is responsible for the organisation of the New Zealand national provincial championship. The 
NZRU collectively bargains and contracts with the New Zealand Rugby Players Association 
(NZRPA). The NZRPA is, similarly, an incorporated society under the 1908 Act , and was 
formed in 1999 ‘in response to the growing demand from players to be represented by their 
own independent body on issues that concern both themselves and the game’.59 The NZRPA 
is a union registered under Part 4 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (ERA). 
a)  The collective bargaining process, strikes, and lockouts 
The ERA is the governing law on employment agreements in New Zealand; any contract 
purporting to contract out of its provisions is ineffective.60 An ‘employer’ means a person 
employing an employee or employees61 and clearly includes the NZRU as the employer of 
professional rugby players in New Zealand. A ‘union’ is defined as a union registered under 
Part 4 of the ERA.62 A registered union is entitled to represent its members in relation to any 
matter involving their collective interests as employees.63 
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The bargaining process in New Zealand is imposed with a statutory duty of good 
faith.64 On a general level, the duty requires the parties inter alia to not do anything to 
mislead or deceive each other and be ‘active and constructive in establishing and maintaining 
a productive employment relationship’.65 An employee bound by a collective agreement may 
agree  to  additional  terms  and  conditions  with  the  employer,  so  long  as  they  are  not 
inconsistent with the terms and conditions in the collective agreement.66 
Strikes and lockouts are dealt with under Part 8 of the ERA. Both are lawful in certain 
circumstances. Strikes or lockouts must relate to the bargaining process; occur 40 days after 
bargaining has commenced; and occur after expiry of a previous collective agreement. 67 A 
strike or lockout is unlawful inter alia if a collective agreement binding the employees is in 
force or if the strike or lockout relates to a personal grievance, a dispute, a bargaining  fee 
clause, or freedom of association.68 The NZRPA has publicly threatened a strike on at least 
one  occasion.  In  2013,  the  head  of  the  NZRPA  stated  that  ‘international  representative 
players  could  take  strike  action  “as  a  last  resort”  to  press  claims  for  an  integrated 
international  season  with  fewer matches’.69 This threat,  although  eventually  avoided, was 
supported by the New Zealand national team coach.70 
b)  The current collective bargaining agreement (CBA) 
The most recent CBA between the NZRU and NZRPA was signed on 21 August 2013.71 The 
agreement places central and exclusive control of rugby governance in the hands of the 
NZRU, which (inter alia) selects and manages NZRU teams, administers all competitions, 
and grants franchises to groups wishing to compete in Super Rugby.72 
The CBA allows the NZRU to contract with individual players depending on ability,73 
using one of several tiered standard form contracts. The NZRU remains the central employer 
                                                 
64 ibid ss 4(4) and 32. 
65 ibid s 4(1A). 
66 ibid s 61. 
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68 ibid s 86(1). 
69 ‘Players may strike over rugby test schedules’ (stuff.co.nz, 13 May 2013) 
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19 January 2015. 
70 ibid. 
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72 ‘Collective  Agreement  between  The  New  Zealand  Rugby  Union  and  the  Rugby  Players  Collective’  (15 
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in all cases.74 To be eligible for the national team, a player must ( inter alia) be a party to a 
NZRU contract at Super Rugby level under the CBA. 75 Further, the agreement (inter alia) 
grants the NZRU a licence to use a player’s image rights on a limited basis each year;76 deals 
with  rugby-specific  terms  such  as  non-selection  for  certain  teams; 77  includes  a  wide 
misconduct clause; 78 sets minimum (but no maximum) remuneration levels; 79 guarantees 
employer contributions to a superannuation scheme;80 ensures that young players are subject 
to a ‘personal development programme’;81 and arranges employer-funded trauma and medical 
insurance.82 
2.  Formula One (F1) 
F1 is the highest level of motor racing sanctioned by international motorsport’s governing 
body,  the  Fédération  Internationale  de  l’Automobile  (FIA).  The  FIA  is  an  international 
federation of 236 national motoring and sporting organisations from 141 countries (Member 
Clubs).83 It is a non-profit voluntary association formed under the French  Association loi de 
1901.84 Accordingly, the FIA is governed by its own internally created statute.  That statute 
states that the General Assembly is the sole governing body of international motor sport, 85 
and consists of the President, the delegation of each FIA Member Club, and the president of 
the  FIA  Drivers’  Commission.86 The  World  Motor  Sport  Council  (WMSC)  is  the  body 
charged  specifically  with  the  creation  and  administration  of  rules  in  F1.  Its  membership 
consists of the FIA President, Deputy President for Sport, seven Vice-Presidents for Sport, 
and 18 other members.87 The President of the Drivers Commission and a representative of the 
Formula One Constructors are members of the WMSC as of right.88 As discussed below, that 
                                                 
74 ibid cl 79. 
75 ibid cl 33.2. 
76 ibid cls 13.1, 14.5, 29.1. 
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83 ‘About the FIA’ <www.fia.com/about-fia> accessed 19 January 2015. 
84 ‘Federation Internationale de l’Automobile’ 
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85 See Statutes of the FIA 
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constructors’ slot is presently held by the head of F1 Management, Bernie Ecclestone. In 
performing its functions, the WMSC is assisted by various Commissions.89 
a)  The regulatory structure of F1 
The regulation of F1 operates on two levels: operational and commercial. The operational 
aspects are governed by FIA regulations such as the International Sporting Code and Formula 
One Regulations; the commercial side is governed by a three-party contract known as the 
Concorde  Agreement,  between  the  FIA,  the  F1  Teams,  and  Formula  One  Management 
(FOM),90 which controls the commercial rights to F1. F1 regulations are made under the 
auspices of the International Sporting Code, which gives specific and detailed guidance on 
how the FIA is to exercise its power as the sole governing body of international motorsport.91 
There  is  also  a  designated  disputes  resolution  process,  with  the  internally -managed 
International Court of Appeal operating as the tribunal of last resort.92 
As mentioned above, the Concorde Agreement, running from 2013 to 2020, plays an 
important role.93 Although the exact terms are confidential, this tripartite agreement between 
the FIA, teams, and FOM sets out the distribution of broadcasting revenue from FOM to the 
FIA and the teams. This structure stems from the acquisition  of F1’s commercial rights by 
Bernie Ecclestone in the late 1970s through his control of the Formula One Constructors 
Association,94 and in reaction to an EU Commission investigation in FIA’s dominant market 
position.95 
b)  The Constructor and Driver Associations 
F1  operates  concurrent  Drivers’  and  Constructors’  World  Championships. 96 In  2008,  a 
pseudo-union  named  the  Formula  One  Teams  Association  (FOTA)  was  established  to 
negotiate en bloc with FIA and Formula One Management in respect of a new Concorde 
Agreement and regulations. This led to fiercely contested negotiations which led (inter alia) 
to  two  members  of  FOTA  being  suspended  for  breaking  ranks, 97 and  the  threat  of  a 
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breakaway ‘Grand Prix World Championship’ series, due to disagreement on cost control and 
distribution of broadcasting revenue.98 However, in 2011 four teams – including the powerful 
Ferrari – left FOTA,99 leading to the weakened FOTA being disbanded in February 2014. 100 
There has been some discussion of the newly formed Formula One Strategy Group (FSG) 
performing some or all of FOTA’s previous functions.101 The FSG consists of 18 members, 
split evenly between the FIA, Formula One Management, and six of the leading F1 teams,102 
and advises the F1 Commission, a body formed by the FIA, which in turn advises the 
WMSC.103 
The F1 drivers’ union is known as the Grand Prix Drivers Association (GDPA), and 
was formed in 1961 with the primary aim of improving driver safety.104 The GDPA is a UK-
registered company105 and is managed by three directors, one of whom is the Chairman. 
Membership is not compulsory (although 19 of 22 drivers were members in 2014) but it is a 
requirement that a driver be a current F1 race or test driver. 106 Decisions are reached by a 
simple majority on a ‘one member, one vote’ basis.107 
The GPDA is not granted any official status by the FIA, nor is it recognised as a trade 
union under any applicable employment law.108 However, an open line of communication 
with the FIA is maintained on an informal level. Further, the FIA informally invites the 
GDPA to relevant committees and working groups. 109 Further again, there has in the past 
been proactive dialogue between FOTA and the GPDA, such as the funding (by FOTA) of a 
pre-race medical check by a private company from 2006. 110 There are several other areas in 
which the GDPA works for its members such as a pooled insurance package which offers 
lower premiums than individually-arranged policies, and the presence of an ex-F1 driver as a 
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Grand  Prix  steward  to  judge  racing  incidents  and  penalties.111 In terms of driver safety 
advocacy, the most notable example of the GPDA’s work was a threat following the 2013 
British Grand Prix to boycott the next race due to several catastrophic tyre failures during that 
race.112 That threat was made unilaterally, without any discussion with the F1 teams or 
FOTA.113 
3.  Mixed Martial Arts (MMA) 
MMA is defined as ‘unarmed combat involving the use … of a combination of techniques 
from  different  disciplines  of  the  martial  arts’.114 Its  popularity  has  grown  enormously  in 
recent years, due at least in part to the growth and success of the world’s largest commercial 
MMA organisation,115 the Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC). The UFC holds a near-
monopoly position in the commercial MMA market. 116 The UFC is run by its parent entity, 
Zuffa LLC (Zuffa), a limited liability company registered in Nevada, USA. 117 However, its 
reach is increasingly global.118 Zuffa (like the NZRU but in contrast to the FIA) is responsible 
for both operational and commercial activities of the UFC. 
Following criticism of its violent nature,119 UFC entered into dialogue with a number 
of USA State Athletic Commissions to form a set of unified MMA rules. California and New 
Jersey’s commissions were the first to sign off a set of codified rules governing MMA fights 
for California in April 2000120 and for New Jersey121 in April 2001. In 2009, the Association 
of Boxing Commissions, an organisation responsible for sanctio ning boxing and MMA 
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events across the USA and Canada,122 adopted the New Jersey rules as the ‘Unified Rules of 
Mixed Martial Arts’.123 
a)  The employment relationship with UFC fighters 
There is no collective bargaining in the UFC. Moreover, fighters competing in UFC events 
are engaged as independent contractors rather than employees.124 Accordingly, each fighter 
negotiates with the UFC on an individual basis and may be subject to any number of unusual 
terms due to inequality in bargaining power.125 Examples of clauses that are common in UFC 
fighter contracts are clauses entitling the fighter to remuneration solely through bonuses 
linked to their success in a fight; 126 total relinquishment of a fighter’s intellectual property 
rights (often in perpetuity); and so-called ‘champion’s clauses’ which automatically extend 
contractual terms of a fighter when a championship is won.127 Moreover, a fighter may fall to 
a lower level of remuneration if he loses a fight during his contract and may even have his 
contract terminated for losing a fight.128 
However, there is one aspect of collective culture in the employment relationship: 
insurance. After a ‘laborious three-year process’ attempting to find an appropriate insurer, 
Zuffa announced a policy on 9 May 2011.129 The policy covers all UFC-contracted athletes 
both in and outside of the USA; has its premiums paid wholly by Zuffa; covers injuries 
suffered in training and at UFC events as well as everyday accidents such as falls and car 
accidents up to $US50,000 per annum; and includes life an d dental insurance.130 Zuffa had 
previously offered insurance only for injuries suffered in a fight.131 
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b)  Other influences 
There has also been some influence of unions on MMA through a peculiar connection to a 
dispute between a Nevada-based culinary workers union (CWL) and its casino employer, 
owned by the UFC.132 After a long-running battle with the casino owners, CWL investigated 
its  employers’ other business activities, which included the UFC and sent  a letter to  the 
Federal Trade Commission in 2011 requesting an antitrust investigation.133 
More recently, CWL was instrumental in working with California state assemblyman 
Luis Alejo to enact state legislation better protecting MMA fighters’ contractual rights.134 
The  Bill  proposed  a  number  of  protections  such  as  a  bans  against  assignment  of 
merchandising  rights  for  an  unreasonable  period  of  time  and  ‘champion  clauses’;  and  a 
lessening of restrictions on fighters’ own sponsorship contracts.135 The Bill was passed in 
May 2012 (amending California’s Business and Professions Code) despite opposition from 
the UFC.136 The purpose of the Act is stated as ‘to protect mixed martial arts fighters from 
being subjected to exploitive, oppressive, or coercive contractual practices that violate the 
athletes’  freedom  to  work  and  their  ability  to  support  themselves  and  their  families  as 
professional athletes’.137 The law requires the state athletic commission to create and enforce 
an MMA Ethical Code, breach of which includes entering into contracts that last longer than 
five years, automatic extension clauses, or a requirement of exclusive bargaining.138 It should 
be noted, however, that this clause falls below the original aims of the Bill. Indeed, some 
have argued that fuller protections on issues omitted in the Act such as pensions, health 
insurance and merchandising revenue will require MMA (most likely, UFC) fighters to 
unionise.139 
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D.  SPECIFIC CHALLENGES FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN 
PROFESSIONAL SPORT 
This section analyses some specific legal challenges that may arise if collective bargaining 
employment law is introduced in sports such as F1 and MMA. This section does not attempt 
to definitively resolve all of these issues but shows that the intersection between sport law 
and  employment  law  (ie  collective  bargaining)  creates  unique  challenges  specific  to 
professional sport. As discussed in Section B, professional sport involves different bodies 
such  as  athletes,  leagues,  and  governing  bodies,  all  of  which  have  some  interest  in  the 
employment of individual athletes. These conflicting interests have material bearing on the 
shape of any collectivised bargaining process. 
1.  The parties to collective bargaining 
a)  The employer and other interested bodies 
The ‘employer’ is clear in respect of rugby (the NZRU) and MMA (the UFC), but is less 
evident in F1. Prima facie, the position may seem clear enough: a driver is contracted by his 
or  her  ‘team’140 (eg  Ferrari)  in  a  binary  employment  relationship.  However,  there  are  a 
number of interrelated relationships between driver, teams, and the FIA, which mean that an 
employment contract is subject to a number of rules and regulations created through a chain 
of vertical contracts from athlete to governing body.141 
Thus, an F1 driver may be bound by the terms of his employment contract with his 
team as well as the sporting a nd technical regulations set out by the FIA. Thus, were the 
GPDA to unionise and bargain with drivers’ immediate employers, it is arguable that the 
governing body should also participate in that process due to the material effect they have on 
this relationship.142 Moreover, the dual world championships of F1 (driver and team) mean 
that the teams also have a parallel contractual relationship with the FIA. As discussed in 
Section C, the team-FIA relationship, whilst not employment in a strict legal sense, has led to 
varying levels of collectivisation by the teams (eg the Formula One Teams’ Association). 
There are therefore two levels of possible collective influence in F1: driver and team. 
The  possibility  of  a  club  and  governing  body  acting  as  a  ‘joint  employer’  was 
discussed in the United States decision North American Soccer League,143 where it was held 
that league (ie governing body) and club (ie teams) constituted a joint employer for the 
purposes  of  collective  bargaining,  due  in  part  to  the  league’s  power  of  veto  over  player 
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transfers  and  the  club’s  autonomous  power  to  modify  the  terms  of  a  standard  player 
contract.144 
FOM is also relevant. This is mainly due to its membership of the Formula One 
Strategy Group (by virtue of its ownership of F1’s commercial rights) which advises the 
World Motorsport Council (and thus the FIA) on the regulatory structure of F1. Through the 
‘flow-down’ of contracts, FOM is therefore able to materially alter a driver’s contractual 
obligations without consultation. The presence of a commercial rights holder as part of a 
collective  employment  contracting  structure  occurs  in  South  African  rugby,  where  the 
players’ union ‘interfaces’ with both the governing body and the separate commercial rights 
holder.145 However, involving the governing b ody and commercial rights holder in the 
collective bargaining process carries an obvious risk of conflicts of interest. A governing 
body’s  position  as  impartial  protector  of  the  game’s  integrity  may  be  jaundiced  by 
commercial  concerns  if  acting  as  an  employer  too,146 particularly if a commercial rights 
holder also has a voice in the process.147 
The asymmetry of interests between drivers, teams, and governing body may also 
mean that there is an unworkably wide range of voices in any collective bargaining process . 
The involvement of up to four parties, each with a different imperative vis -à-vis the sport in 
which they compete may mean that one voice (likely that which holds the most commercial 
bargaining power) is heard over the other parties whose interests may b e more nuanced or 
conflicted, such as a driver participating to pursue both Corinthian ideals and the ability to 
make a living. The bargaining power of even a unionised group of drivers is arguably some 
distance from traditional notions of two -party collective bargaining with an appreciable 
amount of diametrically opposed interests capable of resolution in a binary ‘push and pull’ 
fashion. In an environment as complex as F1, the lack of reciprocity in interests has been 
borne  out  by  drivers  being  prepared  to  in  fact  pay  to  compete.148 It is unclear whether 
unionisation would allow drivers to ameliorate that difficulty in light of the extremely small 
and competitive market discussed in Section B above. 
That said, such risks are not fatal to collective bargainin g. The New Zealand rugby 
CBA, for example, involves an employer who holds all commercial rights and is also the 
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governing body for the sport. Similar arguments can be made for the very profitable major 
professional sports in North America. It is even arguable that facing these conflicts in a 
transparent  manner  through  parties  with  equal  bargaining  strength  will  protect  against 
‘backdoor’  regulatory  abuse.  It  is  only  through  explicitly  recognising,  accepting  and 
embracing  the  direct  relationship  (whether  employment  or  some  other  quasi-contractual 
agreement) between athletes, teams and the governing body of a sport that the governing 
body’s ability to abuse that relationship is guarded against. It seems most logical that the 
party responsible for the organisation and conduct of a sport is accountable to all ultimate 
beneficiaries of the sport being played: not only the public enjoying the sport but also the 
participants involved in the creation of that social good. 
Moreover, placing the parties under collective employment law will likely engage 
protections such as the implied term of trust and confidence in all employment contracts, 
which may restrain the decision-making power of the joint employer.149 This point is related 
to the transparency discussed immediately above. If all parties are aware (as this paper argues 
they should be) that they are actively entering into an employment relationship, then legal 
certainty demands that one party should know with reasonable certainty the consequences of 
its actions as ag ainst another party. The nature of the relationships in professional sport 
strongly suggests that the law of collective bargaining provides the most appropriate forum in 
which to cater for those competing interests. 
b)  Multi-party bargaining 
There is thus a strong argument that, at a minimum, the legal structure of bargaining in F1 
should involve a direct employment relationship between drivers, teams, and the governing 
body. This  multi-party  bargaining would ‘assist  [to] balance the employment  interests of 
players with the commercial and regulatory interests in a professional sports competition 
[and] may provide players with the right to be consulted prior to the implementation of a 
regulatory measure that affects their employment interests’.150 A good example supporting 
this is the 2009 resource restriction agreement (RRA) agreed to by FOTA in response to 
rising costs in F1. The RRA was an agreement only between the teams, with neither the FIA 
nor FOM being a party to it.151 This meant that when teams accused each other of breaches, 
no effective remedy could be granted. 152 The only way the RRA gained proper effect was 
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through the FIA, after consulting with its members and FOM, incorporating some terms of 
the RRA into the sport’s regulations.153 
Courts  seem  prepared  to  give  legal  recognition  to  this  ‘athlete-governing  body’ 
relationship, even in the absence of formal contractual relations. For example, in Jones and 
another v Welsh Rugby Football Union,154 a rugby player was found to have a contract with 
the governing body  merely ‘by virtue of the player’s  registration with  the Welsh  Rugby 
Football Union and his agreement to be subjected to its disciplinary procedures’.155 The well-
known Modahl156 decision is also instructive. That case involved an athlete claiming damages 
from her sport’s governing body for loss of income whilst serving a contested ban, on the 
basis of an implied contractual term that the disciplinary process would be fair. This raised 
the issue of whether an athlete-governing body contract existed. The Court of Appeal held 
(by a majority) that such a relationship did exist despite there being no documentary evidence 
of contract or formal agreement.157 
This begs the question of how such a relationship might look in practice. O’Leary has 
suggested that a ‘tripartite agreement between the player, club and governing body could be 
used’.158 In F1, this could involve a collective bargaining process between a drivers’ union 
(likely the GPDA); a teams’ union (similar to FOTA, discussed in Section C); and the FIA. 
Any  bargaining  protocol  would  have  to  contain  conflict-resolution  clauses  to  deal  with 
possibility of conflict between a driver’s two employers.159 An example of this might be a 
possible driver boycott on safety grounds,160 where it is conceivable that the FIA and teams 
could have differing opinions on the balance to be struck between driver safety and the 
commercial benefit of holding a race. An alternative to the tripartite structure could be to 
have a collectivised ‘team-FIA’ bargaining process, with some expectation or guarantee of 
consultation with drivers were their contractual terms to be altered by that process.161 
2.  The issue of superstars 
To be effective, collective bargaining must include standardised player salaries.162 Indeed, the 
very  poor  remuneration  of  baseball  players  in  the  nineteenth  century  led  to  the  first 
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professional  sport  unions. 163 A  scheme  that  allows  for  each  player  to  be  remunerated 
predictably and according to his or her abilities is a critical aspect of any sporting collective 
agreement;  the  New  Zeal and  Rugby  CBA’s  detailed  provisions  dealing  with  player 
remuneration clearly show this.164 The reasons for having a collective remuneration scheme 
are clear: in essence, all athletes receive a collective voice which encompasses the strongest 
and the weakest within the industry. That collective voice can then be used in the bargaining 
process to ensure that each of these employees receives a fair amount of compensation, 165 
particularly the weakest members who otherwise would have possessed very little bargaining 
power. 
However,  it  is  in  that  collective  strength  that  another  risk  for  injustice  arises. 
Collective contracts clearly have less flexibility than individual contracts.166 Rigidity is useful 
for  raising  the  bar  for  ‘weak’  athletes  who  might  otherwise  go  underpaid.  However,  it 
concurrently lowers the bar for the most talented athletes – the ‘superstars’ – who are the 
biggest draw card in any professional sport.167 Even the rigidly structured pay scale of the 
American National Football League runs the risk of sup erstars ‘restructuring’ lucrative and 
fiercely  negotiated  contracts  to  avoid  an  overly  top-heavy  employee  payroll.168 Although 
superstars are a minority, they have a disproportionately heavy impact on the industry. 169 
This risk is heightened by the fact that the superstar’s skills are essentially non-transferable to 
any other employer, much less another industry.170 Lava summarises the difficulty well: 
[It] is the exceptionally talented players, or the superstars, that suffer the most under 
the process of collective bargaining … [t]hese players have the greatest interest in 
seeing  competition  for  their  services  maximized  and  player  restraints  minimized. 
Once the players’ association is certified as the players’ collective bargaining agent, 
however, the individual employees no longer have complete freedom to bargain on 
their own.171 
                                                 
163 Insley (n 2) 602. 
164 See text to (n 79). 
165 Insley (n 2) 623; Greenfield and Osborn (n 5) 130-1. 
166 Insley (n 2) 624. 
167 Berry and Gould (n 2) 72. 
168 Tony Manfred, ‘There’s A Tricky NFL Salary Cap Loophole That Every Team In The League Has Figured 
Out’  (Business  Insider,  28  February  2013)  <www.businessinsider.com/nfl-contract-restructuring-takes-
advantage-of-loophole-2013-2?IR=T> accessed 19 January 2015. 
169 Mainly through their teams winning more games and bringing the economic ( and non-economic) benefits 
associated with a winning team such as increased employment and ticket revenue. See generally Brice (n 13) 69. 
170 Feldman (n 2) 847. 
171 Lava (n 9) 681. UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
209 
However, the New Zealand rugby CBA shows flexibility is still possible. That CBA 
provides only for minimum salaries, with superstars such as national captain Richie McCaw 
and Sonny Bill Williams given some latitude to negotiate both higher remuneration and, in 
Williams’ case, freedom from exclusivity provisions.172 This arguably gives the superstars 
the flexibility they need to ensure that a union does not unduly lower their remuneration. It is 
arguable that the NFL ‘restructuring’ example also falls into the above category and is in fact 
beneficial to the sport overall. There is force in arguing that, by willingly sacrificing a higher 
salary so other well-known, (relatively) highly paid athletes can be recruited, a superstar 
player (usually a quarterback) exercises his own judgment to sacrifice some personal benefit 
for a net gain in the overall talent of his team’s roster: a discretion that arguably only exists, 
or at least is openly facilitated, by a rigidly-defined pay scale. 
The difficulty, of course, with such flexibility is that the entire point of a union is 
potentially undermined. As Berry & Gould put it, ‘the subtle message to the players is that 
the players’ association is largely irrelevant and more likely a hindrance to their interests’,173 
severely eroding player support for unions. There are also risks that some matters agreed 
between union and employer may be superseded by a number of individual contracts or enter 
‘into that area which might be within the domain of the exclusive bargaining agent in its 
collective bargaining’.174 There is law in the heavily unionised United States that suggests 
that a special arrangement between employer and superstar may be void if it is inconsistent 
with the ‘basic agreement’ formed between union and employer.175 Therefore, any collective 
bargaining agreement may have to sacrifice (at least partially) the ability of superstars to earn 
‘superstar money’. 
3.  Europe: the role of competition law 
a)  The legal framework 
Competition law arguably provides ‘the most important controlling factor’ on the regulation 
of  legal  relationships  by  sport  governing  bodies. 176  The  main  elements  of  European 
competition law particularly relevant to sport (and in particular, collective bargaining) are the 
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prohibition of anti-competitive agreements between undertakings (article 101), and abuse by 
a single dominant undertaking of its dominant position (article 102).177 
Article 101 prohibits ‘all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations 
of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and 
which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition 
within the internal market’.178 An exemption may be granted to agreements that (inter alia) 
promote  economic  progress,  pass  a  share  of  the  benefit  to  consumers,  and  applies  only 
‘indispensable’ restrictions.179 Article 102 prohibits ‘abuse by one or more undertakings of a 
dominant position within the internal market or in a substantial part of it’.180 No exemptions 
can be granted.181 Article 102 consists of three main elements: a dominant position within the 
Union or part of it; abuse of that dominant position; and possible effect on inter -Member 
State trade.182 Dominance will most likely be present in professional sport, as there is usually 
only one governing body in a given market.183 However, it is abuse of that dominance which 
is the critical enquiry.184 
The  relevant  market  involves  consideration  of  the  product  market  and  the 
geographical market, and the concepts of demand -side and supply-side substitutability, that 
is, the extent to which other products are deemed to be substitutable from the point of view of 
consumers  and  suppliers. 185 In  the  European  context,  only  F1  (along  wi th  association 
football) possesses the requisite popularity to operate in a geographical market consisting of 
the entire EU.186 
b)  The Albany exemption 
A collective agreement would be at least partially exempt from competition law, as is also the 
case  in  the  United  States187 and New Zealand. 188 In  Albany  International,189 the (Dutch) 
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employer Albany had allocated a cheap pension supplier to its employees through a collective 
bargaining agreement, thereby refusing to contribute to a different, compulsory, state fund. 
Albany argued that the national scheme was contrary to EU competition law. In holding that 
the  scheme  did  infringe  the  Treaty  but  was  nonetheless  justified  as  a  matter  of  general 
economic  interest,  the  European  Court  of  Justice  (ECJ)  discussed  the  applicability  of 
collective employment agreements to EU competition law. The opinion of Advocate General 
Jacob was  that collective bargaining was  partially immune from  competition law despite 
prima facie restricting competition due to several Community instruments encouraging its 
use. He held that competition law did not apply to ‘core subjects such as wages and other 
working conditions’.190 This reasoning was based around benefits such as conflict and cost 
reduction, increased transparency,191 and a lack of appreciable anticompetitive effect between 
employers, as only one production cost factor of many (wages) was being ‘harmonised’.192 
However,  that  immunity  was  limited  to  guard  (inter  alia)  against  the  risk  of  collective 
bargaining  having  ‘seriously  anticompetitive  effects  on  third  parties  or  third  markets’.193 
Thus, for the exemption to apply the agreement (inter alia) ‘must be one which deals with 
core subjects of collective bargaining such as wages and working conditions and which does 
not directly affect third parties or markets’, with the test being whether the agreement goes 
beyond the labour relationship and affects parties such as clients, suppliers, or consumers.194 
c)  F1 and MMA 
This limited exemption has direct relevance to a sporting collective agreement, given the 
peculiar  nature  of  the  legal  relationships  between  various  interested  bodies  discussed  in 
Sections  B  and  C.  The  presence  of  third  parties  such  as  commercial  rights  holders, 
broadcasters, and insurers indicates that an agreement may affect third party participation in 
the industry and thus fall outside the exemption.195 Although the New Zealand rugby CBA 
has passed scrutiny from its competition regulator, the Commerce Commission, 196 F1 and 
MMA present some interesting issues. In respect of F1, the presence of FOM  is possibly 
problematic.  A  collective  bargaining  process  involving  a  commercial  rights  holder  is 
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arguably precisely the kind of case that should be caught by Albany. Competing broadcasters 
would  likely  face  an  insurmountable  barrier  to  entry  due  to  the  exclusive  employment 
relationship between the FIA, the F1 teams, and FOM (and the broadcasters those bodies 
would contract with). Moreover, the presence of exclusivity in a collective agreement on 
matters such as track access, tyre suppliers, and driver insurance or pensions (as was in the 
case in Albany itself) may also fall outside the competition law exemption. 
A complaint against such conduct could conceivably be brought under Article 101, 
but would require a union to be classified as an ‘undertaking’. Albany held that unions, as 
agents of employees, fell outside that definition197 whilst at the same time leaving borderline 
cases such as professional sport open.198 However, a complaint under article 102 against a 
sport’s governing body would be possible and more conceptually clear. This kind of concern 
was raised in 1999, albeit outside the context of collective bargaining, when the European 
Commission investigated the FIA and indicated a possible breach of competition law due to 
the FIA possessing both regulatory and commercial interests in the sport.199 This led to the 
commercial-regulatory split discussed in Section C above.200 
In  respect  of  the  UFC,  the  insurance  arrangement  discussed  in  Section  C  is 
relevant.201 If such an arrangement were to form part of a colle ctive bargaining agreement 
between the UFC and a fighters’ union, then the position is arguably materially similar to 
Albany in that it may result in a material lessening of competition through restricting other 
insurers’ rights to offer their services to fighters. The argument would likely then turn to 
whether such a restriction actually fell within the limits of the Albany exemption or whether it 
is aimed more at the ‘work conditions’ of employees. 
d)  Broader deference 
As well as the Albany exception to immunity, broader arguments about the nature of the 
sporting industry may lead to some level of deference being applied even if the wider Albany 
exception is not engaged. The 2007 White Paper on sport makes clear that the Commission 
‘takes  into  account  the  specificities  of  sport  in  order  to  regulate  the  sector  in  the  most 
effective and proportionate way’.202 This approach recognises that a court imposing its own 
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view of Community sport policy would be inappropriate.203 Thus, the co-operative nature of 
sport; the participation of volunteers; its social and educational function; the necessary 
element of co-operation between actors; the necessity for uncertainty in result; and relatively 
monopolistic governance will all be taken into account. 204 In Re Televising Premier League 
Football Matches,205 for example, the Restrictive Practices Court held that it was ‘facile’ to 
speak of a club having individual broadcasting rights, as each club depended on the other to 
present an economically valuable product to a broadcaster. 
It is important to note that this approach is not an exemption per se but rather a 
recognition that ‘there is sufficient flexibility in the competition rules to reflect the specific 
characteristics of sport as a social, cultural and economic product’.206 Until the well-known 
Meca-Medina decision,207 there had been a question of whether ‘purely sporting’ rules (such 
as  the size of a playing pitch) fell outside EC  competition  law. However,  Meca-Medina 
firmly rejected that suggestion, holding that any rule with an economic consequence attracted 
competition law.208 Whether this means that certain rules do not breach articles 101 or 102, or 
whether a breach is nonetheless justified, is unclear, but the application of competition law is 
not in question.209 
Thus,  the  Commissi on  has  set  out  a  four -stage  test  on  sport’s  application  to 
competition law which includes a requirement of economic activity, examination of overall 
context of the economic activity, and the proportionality of the measure in light of the sport-
specific aim being pursued.210 The proportionality enquiry involves consideration (inter alia) 
of the need to ensure fairness in sport competitions; equal opportunity for all athletes; 
protection of athletes’ health; and the interdependence of sporting bodies.211 
There is one further point to discuss. Feldman has noted that the most recent round of 
work  stoppages  in  American  professional  basketball  and  football  led  to  player  unions 
dissolving themselves in response to a lockout, so that individual players might challenge 
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employer actions under US antitrust law, free from any employment exemption.212 Feldman 
states that it is at least arguable that an employment exemption would cease to apply post -
dissolution, as ‘players, like all employees, have a fundamental, statutorily protected right to 
choose not to be represented by a union and to refrain from collective bargaining’213 and 
should be able to choose to have relations governed by competition, not employment, law. 
e)  Conclusion 
It is clear that competition law is a potential fetter on collective bargaining agreements in 
professional sport, largely through controls on pricing and third parties’ entry into relevant 
markets. However, the possibility for a deferential Meca-Medina approach, which recognises 
the sport-specific benefits such agreements could bring, is a clear possibility. Although a 
number of other competition law issues in sport have been litigated,214 the question of a 
collective bargaining agreement seems to remain a live issue. It seems, however, that there is 
a strong  argument that collective bargaining agreements may give enough sport -specific 
benefits215 to justify a deferential approach by a court in applying competition law. 
4.  Private international law 
If a governing body (or players’ union) were to accept (or attempt) collective bargaining 
within  their  particular  sport,  any  international  aspect  of  that  sport  might  raise  private 
international law issues. F1, which enjoys global popularity, and MMA, which is rapidly 
increasing its international reach, are interesting examples. 
a)  Choice of law 
The starting point is freedom of contract: parties to any contract, including employment, are 
free to reach agreement on any matter within the boundaries of the applicable law, including 
choice-of-law  clauses.216 For the Nevada-registered UFC and France -registered FIA, the 
choice of law may be important. It is clear that most international bodies usually incorporate 
wherever they find it most convenient. 217 The effect of employment law in a particular 
jurisdiction  presumably  does  not  curren tly  feature  in  that  assessment.  However,  that 
convenience may need to be reassessed in light of the relevant employment law provisions 
that may apply. 
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Several countries in the European Union (including France) have their own specific 
laws on collective bargaining in sport.218 It would presumably be open to the FIA, itself 
registered  in  France,  to  choose  to  become subject  to  those specific  (eg)  French  laws. 
However, to do so would have to be balanced against the differing level of employee or union 
protections that might be offered in other jurisdictions. 219 Similarly, any players’ union that 
wished to be recognised under a given jurisdiction would presumably wish to ‘jurisdiction 
shop’ in this manner as well. 
Further, employment law in a given jurisdiction may apply mandatorily.220 This will 
mean  that  many  of  the  historical  and  practical  advantages  of  sport’s  internal  dispute 
regulation221 would be sacrificed. For example, the traditional use of arbitration as a dispute 
resolution mechanism222 may have to give way to s pecialist employment law tribunals. In 
addition, guarantees as to substantive terms of the employment contract and bargaining 
process would have to be applied. This would involve an assessment as to whether the 
employment law of a given jurisdiction is capable of dealing with the regulatory nuances of a 
given sport – a decision unlikely to be reached easily by a governing body accustomed to 
effective monopoly control. However, there is a strong view amongst sport law commentators 
that increased legal  supervision such as this  is  both  necessary  and desirable, particularly 
where ‘deregulated market mechanisms generate injustices and/or imbalances’.223 
b)  Conflict of laws 
Conflict of laws issues may arise if no choice of law is made in an employment contract (or is 
judicially overridden), or if a union were to attempt recognition in a jurisdiction a governing 
body does not wish to submit to.224 This will involve dual questions of jurisdiction and the 
applicable law, determinable in the EU under the Brussels Convention o f 1968 and the 
Lugano Convention of 1988.225 
In terms of jurisdiction, persons domiciled in a contracting state must, whatever their 
nationality, be sued in the courts of that state .226 This suggests that in the case of FIA, the 
courts of France would have jurisdiction. However, there are a number of exceptions worth 
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noting. For example, a defendant may be sued in another jurisdiction in matters relating to 
employment either where the employer is domiciled, where the employee habitually performs 
his employment or the last place he or she did so.227 In a competition such as F1 where there 
are races across Europe (and indeed the globe), this could create issues. 
In terms of the applicable law, the Rome Regulation 228 is relevant. In contracts of 
employment, a choice of law cannot derogate from mandatory provisions of employment law 
that an employee can apply to his or her situation using the ‘default’ rules of the Rome 
Regulation.229 Those rules state that the contract should be governed by the law of the 
country in which he or she habitually performs his duties, and if that is not determinable, the 
place of business of the employer unless it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the 
contract is more closely connected with another country.230 
This may mean that a UFC fighter performing in the United Kingdom would still be 
able to avail himself of mandatory provisions of the Employment Rights Act 1996 despite 
any purported choice of, eg, Nevada law by the UFC. The position is even more complex in 
respect of F1 drivers, who fulfil their main employment duties  – ie drive in Grand Prix – 
across the globe. Where the employee performs his duties in more than one country, ‘the 
place … where the employee habitually carries out his work means the place where he had 
established the effective centre of his working activities and where he performed the essential 
part of his duties vis-à-vis his employer’.231 Whilst this would most likely be a driver’s team 
factory – eg Italy for a Ferrari driver – the inherently international nature of F1 might lead to 
more creative arguments of truly global employment, or perhaps an argument from the FIA 
that a driver’s submission to the FIA’s rule render French law the appropriate choice. 
 
E.  CONCLUSION 
The intersection of the laws of professional sport and collective bargaining presents a number 
of  interesting  and  unique  challenges.  Whilst  there  are  undoubted  advantages  in  adopting 
collective bargaining in professional sport, the legal structures that have evolved in response 
to the peculiarities of professional sport mean that even in the heavily unionised Unites States 
challenges remain in establishing a coherent and just legal framework. 
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Both the definitional issues of sport and the law that governs it, as well as specific 
challenges in sports such as F1 and MMA, mean that other areas of the law such as contract, 
competition and private international law may fit uncomfortably with collective bargaining, 
at least initially. However, these challenges are certainly not insurmountable. Competition 
law  seems  well  equipped  to  develop  a  clear  doctrine  to  deal  with  collective  sporting 
agreements; there is growing support for multi-party bargaining, and superstar athletes can 
retain some flexibility in their contracting arrangements. Thus, the prevalence of collective 
bargaining may continue to grow in professional sport. This paper has attempted to illustrate 
the issues that must be faced in the process of such growth. 